



Tyrannized Childhood of the Liberator-Philosopher:
J. S. Mill and Poetry as Second Childhood
Joshua M. Hall

In this chapter, I will explore the intersection of philosophy and childhood through the intriguing case study of J. S. Mill, who was almost completely denied a childhood—in the nineteenth-century sense of a qualitatively distinct period inclusive of greater play, imaginative freedom, flexibility, and education.​[1]​ For his part, Mill’s lack of such a childhood was the direct result of his father, James Mill (economic theorist and early proponent of Utilitarianism), who in a letter to Jeremy Bentham explicitly formulates a plan to raise his son as an experiment in the Utilitarian “science” of ethics. More specifically, although James Mill’s end was to create a near-superhuman champion of Utilitarianism, his means to that end included denying John access to other children and the Romantic poetry of his contemporaries. Despite this oppressive lack of a childhood, however, J. S. Mill went on to become perhaps the most influential social and political reformer in British history, especially in regard to gender relations through his groundbreaking work for women’s suffrage. This begs the central question of this chapter, namely how could a philosopher’s tyrannized childhood nevertheless lead to his later overturning of such tyranny in the political sphere? 
There have been two famous answers to such questions in Western intellectual history, and both stem from Freudian psychoanalysis. According to the first answer, when a child experiences too little freedom, she or he is actually more likely to eventually rebel against any and all authorities. In short, the tyrannical condition breeds its own overthrow. (One is reminded here of Harold Bloom’s Anxiety of Influence.) And the second answer is encapsulated in Freud’s famous phrase, “the return of the repressed.” Here, the immature impulsivity and triviality bottled up during the person’s actual childhood explode into a second childhood that disrupts the normal functioning adult. Though there is support for both of these answers, something still seems to be missing. Put simply, it is an empirical fact that not all hyperrepressed children become either rebels or childlike adults. On the contrary, such childhoods lead to an entire spectrum of adult behavior, from rebels all the way to adults who are every bit as repressed (as individuals, and also as parents) as when they were children. What is missing, then, is the tertium quid, the catalyst that—when added to a repressed, or “tyrannized” childhood—sometimes eventuates in a rebellion. Sometimes, against political tyranny in particular. 
One good candidate for this third factor, as illustrated in Mill’s life, and articulated in his philosophical writings, is Mill’s own singular conception of poetry. Western philosophy—using the totalitarian model of Plato’s Republic when read as a utopian program—has tended to assume that a tyrannized childhood is necessary if the child to become a liberator-philosopher. I will argue, however, that this liberation is the accomplishment, instead, of poetry. More specifically, I will conclude that poetry preserves and crystallizes something about the contemporary conception of childhood, as described by both Gareth Matthews and Philip Ariès. As a result, the child within the (adult) poet can reach and reawaken the childhood within the adult who was once a tyrannized child. Thus, it is only in the wake of this poetic renaissance that an adult philosopher, like J. S. Mill, can become a liberator-philosopher.​[2]​
	To repeat my central claim, contrary to (psychoanalytically-informed) contemporary commonsense, deprivation of childhood, leading to an adolescent rebellion against said deprivation, is not a sufficient condition for children to grow up to be the fighters for social justice that more and more parents hope they will be; instead, the biological childhood that was suppressed must be simplified, during biological adulthood, with something that contains in itself something essential to the contemporary notion of childhood (as a period of play, creativity, flexibility and education)—for example, inspired by J. S. Mill’s case, lyric poetry. Thus, poetry’s condensation of childhood is what enables it to compensate for the loss of a biological childhood, such that an adult can achieve the sort of social reform associated with childhood—including greater playfulness, creativity, flexibility and educational opportunities for all. 
	The implications for childhood and the philosophy of childhood, finally, are that poetry can be utilized to restore aspects of childhood that some children currently lack (for example, in a kind of poetic subtype of art therapy in general), and that we should consider poetic sources (including philosophy written in verse, as in texts such as the Bhagavad Gita and the Daodejing) when bringing philosophy to bear on childhood.

Biography: Three Tyrannies contra Childhood and Poetry
Before turning to Mill’s analyses of poetry, I will begin with some reflections on biographer Bruce Kinzer’s account of Mill’s childhood, in juxtaposition with a few moments from Mill’s famous autobiography. Summarizing the four “aims” of the autobiography, Kinzer asserts that “Mill meant to show” with his life story “that the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity enjoyed a more limited writ than was often supposed.” Kinzer subsequently elaborates on this claim as follows: Mill's “treatment of his childhood is governed in part by his sense of its bearing upon the problem of determinism and the resolution of that problem.”​[3]​ This is one level at which Mill’s childhood was a tyrannized, namely at the metaphysical level—by metaphysical determinism.
There was also, at a second level of tyranny—namely, parenting—a man behind this metaphysics for Mill. In Kinzer’s narrative, this man is the heroic antagonist and most important figure in Mill’s entire life: his father James. In addition to being governed “in part” by the doctrine of metaphysical necessity, Mill’s autobiographical treatment of his childhood was also governed, according to Kinzer, “in very considerable part by his need to raise the ghost of his father, James Mill, and lay that ghost to rest.”​[4]​ Here Kinzer invokes the archetype, famous especially since the dawn of psychoanalysis, of the ghost of Hamlet’s father. This, then, is the second level at which Mill’s was a tyrannized childhood, namely at the familial level—by a totalitarian father. 
Kinzer elaborates on what Freud would call the Mills’ “family drama” as follows: “If J. S. Mill was indeed a ‘manufactured man,’ as he says he at one time feared, the identity of his maker could not be doubted.”​[5]​ Kinzer’s reference here is inaccurate, however, as this phrase appears in the form of a quotation within Mill’s Autobiography. That is, it is a quote, not from J. S. Mill himself, but from one of Mill’s friends, regarding the friend’s fear—later dispelled—that Mill might be such a “manufactured man.” In addition to this factual error, it is also disconcerting that Kinzer appears to accept as unproblematic the idea that anyone could be “manufactured.” Perhaps Kinzer's failure to call the latter conception into question ultimately reinforces the (now posthumous) oppressive tyranny of James over Mill? In this possibility, it becomes clear that a parent’s tyranny over her or his child can continue beyond the death of both the parent and the child. In part, this can occur through an overshadowing of what the child-within-the-adult-child accomplished. Mill’s case, for example, includes his sympathetic struggles on behalf of women and people of oppressed ethnic/racial groups.
At a third level of tyranny—namely, formal pedagogy—Mill’s education, Kinzer tells us, “was wholly under the direction of his father.”​[6]​ In addition to this total control, the way in which James conceived his role is even more unsettling. In a letter James wrote to the man who had married James’ own first love, one finds the following passage: “I intend to run a fair race with you in the education of a son. Let us have a well-disputed trial which of us twenty years hence can exhibit the most accomplished & virtuous young man.”​[7]​ In other words, over a hundred years before the behaviorist B. F. Skinner’s infamously-controlling parenting, James Mill, too, imagined raising a child as a kind of psychology experiment. And at the end of this experiment, the well-trained subject could be “exhibited” for public approval, somewhat like the American Indians that the conquistadors brought back to Europe for public display. In a sense, therefore, Mill’s entire biological childhood was over before it started, reduced to the status of a science experiment.
More specifically, Kinzer observes that the “learning environment created by James Mill wore a menacing aspect.”​[8]​ To understand this as merely the harsh approach of a Christian taskmaster, however, would not be accurate. “By the time the education of John had begun,” Kinzer observes, “James Mill had ceased to be a Christian (if he ever truly had been one) and had become a skeptic.” And yet, this plan was not exactly the work of a non-Christian, either. As Kinzer follows this by saying that “the puritan strain characteristic of the Presbyterians in which he had been reared nevertheless retained a conspicuous hold on” James Mill.​[9]​ Moreover, having raised his son without religion, James nevertheless “cautioned his son against revealing his want of religious faith.”​[10]​  
In another example of controlled duplicity, James saw to it that “John had been kept ignorant of his contemporaries’ relative ignorance” in order “to ensure that his eldest son would not develop a lofty view of his own accomplishments.”​[11]​ Finally, an additional reason for keeping J. S. Mill in the dark, and one which Kinzer nowhere mentions, is that James might have wanted to prevent his son from challenging James’ tyrannical methods, on the grounds that Mill was already far in advance of his peers. James was the master, and many masters—including the white slaveholders of the United States—have explicitly noted that compulsory ignorance is necessary to keep one’s slaves in subjection. 
To summarize this third (pedagogical) level of tyranny, Mill’s childhood was further tyrannized by his education in the following three ways: by being deprived of (1) the possibility of religion (should John Stuart have desired it); (2) the freedom to express his atheistic views truthfully and openly, and (3) a basic awareness of Mill’s own hard-earned accomplishments. [//combined paragraphs//]The intensity of this multi-level tyrannizing is illustrated vividly by one of Mill’s journal entries, which refers to a period of several months spent away from James (in France) as “les plus hereux de ma jeunesse [the most happy of my youth]” (AL 22). Even then, however, though physically distant from his father, Mill remained under the latter’s tight psychological control. For example, Kinzer tells us that James “had told his son to keep a record of all that he did, and John understood for whom the record was being kept.”​[12]​ Presumably for reasons such as these, Mill claims in an unpublished early version of the Autobiography, that he “grew up in the absence of love and the presence of fear; and many and indelible are the effects of this bringing-up in the stunting of my moral growth” (22). Here we have first-hand testimony of what is discussed, repeatedly in this volume, of how the parent-child relationship continues to affect us as adults.
At moments Kinzer appears to share in my criticism of James’ tyranny over J. S. Mill’s childhood. For example, Kinzer refers—himself using the rhetoric of tyranny—to James’ “authoritarian demeanor,” and notes that the “dictatorial implementation of this program cost James Mill his son’s affection.”​[13]​ At other moments, however, Kinzer’s perspective on this tyrannizing is ambivalent. In summarizing this parent-child relationship, and on the same page as the preceding quote, Kinzer claims that James was both “the great intellectual benefactor and the oppressive emotional bane of [Mill’s] childhood.”​[14]​ Kinzer’s rhetoric here makes James sound like a version of the Christian God the Father, not only the source of both goodness and suffering, but also a being of infinite and inescapable power. 
In one example of this dynamic, Kinzer relates a story about a time when James considered moving his family to France. On the one hand, James justified this possibility by claiming that “the French people will soon be very quiet & contented slaves, and the despotism of the Bourbons a quiet, gentle despotism.” On the other hand, for J. S. Mill, as Kinzer continues, “The one thing that could make France an unendurable place for John [Stuart] Mill to reside would be a conviction that the French people had become ‘quiet and contented slaves.’”​[15]​  
For a second example, a certain rebelliousness—or lack of slavishness—in the adolescent, Mill’s friends later created tension between the tyrannized child and tyrannical father. Kinzer notes that James “had striven to control his eldest son’s social contacts,” and so when Mill “brought Roebuck and Graham for a Sunday visit to Dorking,” James “had words with Roebuck, a combative personality with a large ego and immense self-confidence. Roebuck and Graham returned to London on Monday morning” and never again did J. S. Mill “take them where they clearly were not welcome.”​[16]​  [//combined paragraphs//]The most famous example of rebellion in J. S. Mill’s life, though, came after his nervous breakdown, following close on the heels of his father’s death, which itself was followed almost immediately by Mill’s convalescence through Romantic poetry. In the introduction to a collection of Mill’s essays on literature and society, drawn from autobiographical material, Mill describes how his 20 year-old self, having realized his dream of being “a reformer of the world,” suddenly
came to feel that the achievement of all his ideas for world reform would not make him happy. He feared that his education had left him permanently cold and emotionless, and that he would never again have any urge to do anything. A similar condition, it seemed to him, might overtake everyone once the struggle to simply be alive was no longer severe and physical comfort could be taken for granted. This state of mind—described exactly, he says, by Coleridge’s “Dejection: An Ode”—began to disappear when Mill found himself weeping over a sentimental passage from a French author. Convinced by this that he still had some capacity for feeling, he gradually recovered and acquired a renewed interest in life and work. (AL 11)
In the wake of these events, although Kinzer admits that Mill himself, rather than James, “became the directing force” of his own development, the aim of that force according to Kinzer was merely “to complement and complete the superb and indispensable education he had received.”​[17]​ In other words, for Kinzer, J. S. Mill’s own aim was not to rebel against (let alone overthrow) the totalitarian forces that shaped his tyrannized childhood. On the contrary, for Kinzer, James’ power over his “manufactured” son was ultimately absolute.
Significantly in this regard, Kinzer devotes little time, and shows little interest, in the role that poetry (that is, modern lyric poetry) had in J. S. Mill’s life. This is strange for at least three reasons. First, on a biographical note, Mill famously attributes paramount importance to poetry in the autobiography (namely, crediting lines from Coleridge’s “Dejection: An Ode” as single-handedly awakening him from depression and nihilism into a kind of second childhood of hope and happiness). Second, in terms of utilitarianism, poetry is an ideal example of Mill’s distinction between “higher” versus “lower” pleasures—just as Bentham’s infamous “push-pin is as good as poetry” became symbolic of utilitarianism as a morality “fit for swine.” And third, Mill also wrote several lesser-known philosophical pieces about poetry. It is to the latter to which I will now turn, and for the remainder of this chapter.

“Coleridge”: Poetry as Personal and Political Liberator 
In their current form, Mill’s texts on poetry constitute two independent essays, entitled “Coleridge” and “What is Poetry?” Beginning with the former, Mill describes the titular figure of the essay as follows: Coleridge “has been the great awakener in this country of the spirit of philosophy” (LS 291). Note the move from the level of the individual—one poem from Coleridge saving Mill’s life—to the level of the universal—Coleridge as poet saving philosophy in England. It is surprising, given the historical rivalry between Utilitarianism and Kantian ethical theories, that Mill the Utilitarian would praise Coleridge qua Kantian so highly. 
Also surprising is Mill’s subsequent claim that Bentham (the founder of Utilitarianism) and Coleridge are “in reality allies,” as “opposite poles of one great force of progression” (LS 324). More specifically, Mill credits (what he terms) the “Germano-Coleridge school” with “the largest [contribution] made by any class of thinkers” to “the philosophy of human culture” (308). Part of this “Germano-Coleridge” tradition’s contribution, Mill elaborates, is its emphasis on the necessity, for political stability, of “a system of education,” which for the Greeks included poetry (LS 298, 308). And poetry, Mill asserts, is “either nothing, or it is the better part of all art whatever, and of real life too” (103). 
Moreover this connection between the educational focus of the Germano-Coleridge school and poetry aligns with Ariès claim in Centuries of Childhood that the modern conception of childhood is predominantly the result of compulsory formal education. For example, during the Middle Ages adults and children wore the same type of clothes, and then first boys, and later girls, started wearing distinctive clothing—each at the time that compulsory education became normal for their sex.​[18]​ That is to say, poetry, as educational, already has an important link to contemporary childhood. 
To repeat, J. S. Mill, the philosopher traditionally understood as reducing all goodness to base pleasure, here claims that poetry constitutes the largest and most important part of the arts, and of life itself. This valorization seems less counterintuitive, however, in light of the aforementioned passage regarding Mill’s nervous breakdown and poetry-inspired recovery. That is, Coleridge was also Mill’s own personal “great [re-]awakener of the spirit of philosophy.” At one level, Coleridge’s philosophy was an ally of Bentham’s Utilitarian philosophy in Mill’s philosophical development. And at another level, Coleridge’s poetry birthed a second childhood for Mill’s troubled childhood psyche.
The pressing question, particularly for my overall aims here, is as follows: what exactly is it about poetry specifically that allowed it to compensate for Mill’s tyrannized childhood and offer him a second childhood? Keeping in mind, moreover, that this second childhood included Mill’s liberating work for and with disempowered communities, including people of color (including the Irish and the black Jamaican subjects), women, and thereby the children of whom women continue to have primary responsibility in our patriarchal society. To attempt an answer, I now turn to Mill’s more in-depth analyses of poetry. In brief, that answer is that there is something child-like about poetry itself, which in turn illuminates something poetic about childhood.

“What is Poetry?”: Three Aspects of Childlike Liberation
Mill’s other essay on poetry, “What is Poetry?” originally consisted of two separate essays, the first offering an outline for an expressionist theory of art. According to Mill, the primary meaning of the concept “poetry” is that which, in any artistic medium, “produces its effects by an appeal to the emotions” (LS 116). Ultimately then, poetry amounts to anything which “expresses human feeling, or character, which is only a certain state of feeling grown habitual.” On this definition of poetry, for example, the concept of “dignity” that Mill articulates in Utilitarianism would qualify, as would the hero’s openness to self-sacrifice (which in Utilitarianism is described as “the highest virtue which can be found”).​[19]​ The reason that both dignity and heroic self-sacrifice are poetry, in Mill’s sense, is that they both express the character of those who find happiness in virtue. 
And character, to repeat, according to Mill is the habituation of the feelings that begin in childhood. That is, poetry’s expressiveness of inner feelings and character make it a kind of time-travel device, a vehicle whose forward window always reveals something as far back as the childhood of the person. For example, if my father raises me to be stoic and reserved, then whenever my behavior manifests these traits, one can read in this manifestation my childhood subjection to my father’s particular educational/socializing strategy for me. In short, while the outside of a person is largely the effect of the present, the inside of a person is to a much greater degree the cumulative past, and with a particular emphasis on childhood. 
Mill then proceeds to clarify this conception of poetry by presenting it as one of the two opposing terms in three different dichotomies. First, Mill claims that poetry differs from novels specifically in that “the interest excited” by novels “is derived from incident,” whereas the interest excited by poetry, derives “from the representation of feeling” (LS 104). Put simply, poetry in this first dichotomy is opposed to narrative. Because of this distinction, Mill argues that poetry is more appropriate for adults—especially those whose “minds and hearts” are “of greatest depth and elevation”—who have had sufficient experiences to find poetry’s representation of feeling meaningful (105). To relate this back to my own thesis, this point suggests that it might be necessary for the tyrannized child to first grow up before the saving power of poetry can have its maximal restorative effect. In other words, the first (biological) childhood may have to end before poetry can rebirth the second (metaphorical) childhood (including that of the liberator-philosopher).
To elaborate on this important point, poetry crystallizes aspects of childhood, including the kind of intense feelings whose intensity derives from their novelty in the child’s life. For example, the first time I ride in a car is vastly more exciting than the 1,000th time I do so. But this crystallization can only have its full effect after the feelings have become sufficiently tamed or dulled by repetition, such that one can be reminded or reawakened to the intensity of the feeling. To continue the example, I can only really appreciate a poem about the excitement of riding in a car for the first time once I have achieved enough temporal and emotional distance from my own first experience of a car ride in order to conceptualize and experience that feeling as a distinct feeling qua object (as opposed to being subjectively overwhelmed by that feeling as the hue and contour of my world, in something like the way Merleau-Ponty describes emotion in Phenomenology of Perception). And by thus objectifying the feeling, poetry indirectly objectifies childhood as well, as the state in which that feeling occurred (because in which state alone it was possible). 
In the second of Mill’s three dichotomies, he proceeds to oppose poetry to mere “description.” He concedes, though, that description itself may at times be poetic, namely “when shown through any impassioned medium” (LS 108). The poetry in such descriptions, Mill clarifies, “is not in the object itself, nor in the scientific truth itself, but in the state of mind in which the one and the other may be contemplated” (107). Compared to the first dichotomy, then, this second dichotomy appears to favor childhood in a more straightforward way. To wit, for the child, compared to the adult, the ratio of internal feeling to external experience (so to speak) is much higher. In other words, the child (having lived fewer years than the adult), necessarily (a) has had less total time in which to have experiences per se, and also (b) possesses fewer cognitive resources or strategies for expressing her or his feelings externally.
To put this point differently, poetry is more first-person oriented than third-person oriented, and in this way it is more like childhood and less like adulthood. The reason is that adulthood involves achieving fixed roles and function in society, becoming somewhat rigid in one’s habits in those roles, and becoming increasingly inflexible and insensitive to other ways of living and being. In short, one becomes more and more like a one-dimensional character described in a conventional narrative, a puppet led by its particular strings. A child in our society, by contrast, is much harder to describe, in part because the child’s actions retain a greater spontaneity, flexibility, and variability, which is best encapsulated perhaps in free play and open-ended educational situations. In short, more of the child lies hidden within the first-person, while more of the adult is amenable to third-person descriptions.
Finally, in the third dichotomy, which Mill qualifies as subject “to correction from” the “German artists and critics,” he opposes poetry to “eloquence.” Where eloquence “is heard, poetry is overheard . . . in the poet’s utter unconsciousness of a listener” (LS 109). In Mill’s own poetic paraphrase of this point, poetry is “feeling confessing itself to itself, in moments of solitude, and bodying itself forth in symbols” (109). Note here the importance of privacy, in diametric Romantic opposition to the Classical Greek influences from Mill’s childhood. For the latter, as explained by Harold Bloom in his introduction to Plato’s Republic, “[a]lmost all public speech was written in verse,” to the degree that the Ancient Greek word for “prose” itself was even “composed from words meaning ‘to speak privately.’”​[20]​  
In short, for Mill, “All poetry “is of the nature of soliloquy,” thus necessarily “excluding” all “looking-forth into the outward and everyday world” (LS 110). Consequently, “when the act of utterance is not itself the end, but a means to an end,” according to Mill, “then it ceases to be poetry” (110). Moreover, a preference for solitude and an inclination to soliloquy are symptomatic of depth and intense feeling, from which Mill concludes the following. “The persons who have most feeling of their own, if intellectual culture have [sic] given them a language in which to express it, have the highest faculty of poetry” (110). 
To relate this back to my own thesis, this greater solitude of poetry is also true of childhood, given poetry’s increasingly clear intimacy with childhood. And it is true not only for Mill’s (first) childhood in particular, since he was denied the freedom to play with other children (aside from his family), but for childhood in general. For one thing, children’s freedom to leave the home (or even their rooms) is subject to their caretakers’ permission, which means that children in our society are relatively disempowered (compared to adults) in terms of their ability to choose when to be social and when to be alone. That is, children often find themselves forced by boredom and involuntary isolation into engaging in activities that can be done in solitude, which is also the purview of poetry. 
To appreciate the scope and importance of this point, it is helpful to consider Ariès discussion of privacy in his historical account of the simultaneous emergence of the modern family, education and concept of childhood.​[21]​ In essence, he argues that it was the return, in the eighteenth century, of children to the home (from places like boarding school and military academies in the seventeenth century) that facilitated a change from large communal homes with undifferentiated living spaces, to smaller, more private modern houses with their separate quarters for eating, sleeping, entertaining visitors, etc.; and this, in turn, led to the creation of modern privacy, the possibility of solitude, and parent’s increasing emphasis on children’s health and education. 
In conclusion, Ariès writes, “sociability and the concept of the family were incompatible, and could only develop at each other’s expense.”​[22]​ That is, children returning home helped create the modern nuclear family living arrangement, which created modern privacy, along with compulsory elementary education (for the children with whom the parents lived in the more segregated space of the modern house. Thus, lyric poetry, like modern childhood, is more about solitary soliloquy than the bustling social world, with its emphasis on rhetorical effectiveness, which sociability the modern family—newly-centered on the child—undermined. 
	This latter point, finally, takes us naturally to the second half of “What is Poetry?” since Mill’s thesis there is exactly this (childhood-relevant) claim that sensitivity plus a liberal education leads to poetic greatness.

“The Two Kinds of Poetry”: Liberating Power in Sensitivity and Gender
	 The original title of this second half of Mill’s second essay on poetry was “The Two Kinds of Poetry,” and at its core is his analysis of the great Romantic poet Percy Bysshe Shelly. Significantly for Mill, Shelley too had an infamously tyrannized childhood. In Shelley’s case, this included being the victim of severe mental and physical bullying by his classmates (which they called “Shelley-baits”) at a boarding school at age ten.​[23]​ “The Two Kinds of Poetry” is also significant in that, as the editor J. B. Schneewind notes in his introduction, is “one of the first essays which Mill attributed to the inspiration of Harriet Taylor,” Mill’s wife, and a philosopher in her own right (102). Perhaps for this reason, Mill’s entire essay is encapsulated in an insightful metaphor about women’s oppression under patriarchy, as I will discuss below.
“The Two Kinds of Poetry” begins with Mill’s assertion that “to no one of the spiritual benefactors of mankind is a higher or a more assiduous intellectual culture needful than to the poet” (LS 118). Mill makes a fundamental distinction, however, between “a poet by nature” and “the poetry of mere culture” (118). The paradigmatic examples of these two kinds of poets for Mill are Shelley (qua poet) and the work of William Wordsworth (qua poetry), respectively. It is important to Mill, here, that these categories are not strictly analogous, insofar as the former type (the poetry by nature) includes the whole person, while the latter type (the poetry of mere culture) only includes the poet’s written texts. The true poets, Mill goes on to claim, are those “who are so constituted that emotions are the links of association by which their ideas, both sensuous and spiritual, are connected together” (119). For this reason, not just the personhood in general of the poet by nature, but more specifically her or his childhood, is of vital importance, since it is during childhood that the first and most powerful associations are emblazoned on the poet’s psyche.
Shortly thereafter, Mill notes explicitly what was already implied in “What is Poetry?,” namely that lyric poetry, “if the view we are now taking of poetry be correct,” is “more eminently and peculiarly poetry than any other” kind of poetry (LS 123). This identification of lyric poetry as poetry per se is significant for Mill for three reasons. First, it valorizes the (British Romantic) poetry of Mill’s second childhood over the (Ancient Greek and Latin) epic and dramatic poetry of his tyrannized (biological) childhood. Second, it privileges the form of poetry which is by far the most important for children, given the shorter length and narrative simplicity of lyric poetry. And third, this identification justifies my own use of the term “poetry” in this chapter, since in contemporary usage, too, “poetry” usually means lyric poetry in particular. 
I return now to Shelley as “poet by nature.” Though Shelley is for Mill the naturally superior poet, Mill nevertheless claims that “culture” is wanting in Shelley. If such culture had been present, however, it “might have made of him the greatest of our poets,” according to Mill (LS 124). More precisely, the “susceptibility of his nervous system, which made his emotions intense, made also the external impressions of his external senses deep and clear” (124). In short, high nervous susceptibility can contribute to both (a) intensity of internal feeling, and also (b) perspicacity of outer perception. Thus, on the one hand, the source of Shelley’s greatest power is also the condition for the possibility of his greatest weakness, according to Mill. But on the other hand, this weakness is only present insofar as Shelley’s susceptibility has not been disciplined by cultural education. One could say, then, that in Mill’s view Shelley was a kind of “child for life,” blessed with the kind of freshness that Gareth B. Matthews celebrates in children’s artistic productions.​[24]​ 
This point deserves further elaboration, particularly since the triadic relationship among philosophy, childhood and poetry is actually a recurring theme in Matthews’s work, at both a direct and an indirect level. The upshot of the poetic dimensions in Matthews’s philosophy of childhood, for my own concerns here, is that it shows that children, for Matthews, tend to be poetic in their philosophical productions, and that adult philosophers need to be willing and able to philosophize in a poetic way in order to do justice to this poetic quality of their work.
Beginning with the direct theme, Matthews repeatedly connects poetry to childhood, by way of philosophy. To take just a few examples, he remarks early on that “poetry, like philosophy, is its own reward.” For another example, “in philosophy, as in poetry, freshness and inventiveness are much to be prized.” And for a third, Matthews praises the philosophical stories of children’s author Arnold Lobel for having “the grace, humor and profundity of great poetry.”​[25]​  
Poetry is of even greater importance to Matthews’s work in an indirect way when he does not use the word “poetry” itself. For one thing, in regard to his own method in the book, Matthews admits to engaging strategically in the kind of deception, exaggeration, and “appealing distortion” (his words) for which poetry is (in)famous. More precisely, though he concedes that his view of children as philosophers “is a distortion,” he suggests that “the best way to correct one distortion is to pair it with an appealing, but opposed, distortion.”​[26]​ In addition to being a crucial part of his own methodology, poetry is also crucial, according to Matthews, in the philosophical methods employed by children. For example, he characterizes the claims made by children who were subjects in Piaget’s experiments regarding the concepts of conservation (e.g., of substance, weight, and volume) as engaged in poetically fanciful but inaccurate speculation, whose “intellectual beauty” compensates for their empirical falseness.​[27]​ 
Finally in regard to the indirect importance of poetry in his text, Matthews notes the at times greater capacity in children for “moral imagination.”​[28]​  This greater capacity, Matthews claims, requires a construing of someone else’s situation as the same as one’s own, in order to act with benevolent compassion.  And especially in Mill’s conception, such a construting constitutes a poetic act. In short, both Matthews and the children whom he studies find themselves beautiful distorters, following Dickinson’s famous poetic dictum: “Tell all the truth, but tell it slant / Success in circuit lies / Too bright for our infirm delight / The truth’s superb surprise!”​[29]​ 
Returning to Mill’s essay, he then goes on to clarify his point about Shelley’s susceptibility through a contrast with Wordsworth (as author of the “poetry of mere culture”), specifically with the following gendered metaphor (as I noted above):
Wordsworth economizes an image, and detains it until he has distilled all the poetry out of it, and it will not yield a drop more: Shelley lavishes his with a profusion which is unconscious because it is inexhaustible. The one, like a thrifty housewife, uses all his materials and wastes none: the other scatters them with a reckless prodigality of wealth of which there is perhaps no similar instance. (LS 125)
The analogy to the “housewife” here is intriguing and problematic,  but in the space constraints here I will focus on the term’s superficial meaning. Wordsworth, though for Mill the naturally inferior poet, is nevertheless at least as successful as (if not more so than) the naturally-superior poet, Shelley, because Wordsworth has the economical discipline of the average, successful middle-class woman in a patriarchal society. Shelley, by contrast, is like a brilliantly-talented woman who is nevertheless unsuccessful as a disempowered homemaker. In other words, Shelley is like a female child with enormous potential—female because of a nervous sensitivity associated with women under patriarchy, and a child because of his freshness of vision. And though this potential is wasted through lack of education, it nevertheless shines through in occasional moments of brilliant greatness.

Conclusion: Poetry and Second Childhood
In conclusion, it is not the tyrannized childhood per se—that is, the lack of a well-rounded socialization and education—that by itself makes for a great liberator-poet such as Shelley, or a great philosopher-liberator like Mill. Instead, the poetry in Shelley—like the poetry in Coleridge that saved Mill’s life—is what helps overcome the defects of such a tyrannized childhood. Moreover, it is the childhood within poetry that enables it to reawaken a second childhood in us all. In Mill’s case in particular, this second childhood, rebirthed by poetry, helped compensate for his first childhood, transforming him into the great liberator-philosopher. 
And from his life, and the role that poetry played in it, we can better understand the ways in which our modern notion of childhood is inherently poetic. One important implication of the latter, finally, is that in trying to understand children, and their philosophical capacities and productions, adults need to both be attentive to the poetic register of their existence and work, and also be prepared to think and work poetically ourselves in that very endeavor. 
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